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Mansfield (D., Montana) July 8, 1954 
GENEVA: FAILURE OF A POLICY 
Mr. President: The war in Indochina appears on the verge of ending in 
a truce. The blood-letting of the past eight years will probably come to a close 
very shortly. There will be no more Dien Bien Phus, at least for the present. 
The danger of armed involvement of American forces in Indochina, once so close, 
has receded. 
These are welcome by-products of the Geneva Conference. There is 
little else. The situation in Korea, presumably the principal reason for our par-
ticipation in the conference, remains unchanged; thousands of American soldiers 
are still committed there on the mainland of Asia. 
With respect to Indochina, a serious defeat has been inflicted on 
American diplomacy. And in the process vast new areas have been opened for 
potential conquest by communist totalitarianism. 
Last spring, in two speeches in the Senate, I expressed the 
view that our consent to participate in the Geneva proceedings was a 
mistake. I did so because it was clear at the time that the communists 
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would enter the conference, for all practical purposes, as a bloc; that the 
communists, whether from the Soviet Union, l<orea, China or Indochina 
would possess a singleness of outlook. It was not clear that the non-communist 
nations shared any such unity of objective. The British wanted to stay out of 
Indochina. The French wanted to get out of Indochina and for a whil~ it 
seemed that we were on the verge of getting into Indochina. 
In these circumstances, how coul<l negotiations lead to anything but 
failure for the non - communist powers? 
These were the consequences which I felt might flow from a failure 
at Geneva, as I stated them last April 14th on the floor of the Senate: 
Patterns may be set which might influence the entire 
political fabric of the French Republic and touch on every 
aspect of Western European unity. Patterns may be set 
which will determine whether aggression shall again 
gather force on the shores of the South China seas to be 
hurled at this nation from across the Pacific . 
Certain of these r esults are already apparent. The Geneva conference 
has served to increase vastly the stature of the Chinese Communists in Asia 
and throughout the world, Their influence now takes firm root in northe r n 
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Indochina. All the rest of southeast Ada lies before this totalitarian wave 
which has spilled over the borders of south China. The path of advance to 
the west unfolds through small nations and points ultimately to India. South-
wards and eastwards, over the intervening islands of the Pacific, the path 
stretches towards New Zealand, Australia and the Americas. 
These grim prospects are not likely to materielize tomorrow or 
next month. It may be years or decades before the full effects of the loss of 
Indochina will be fully felt or understood. 
Political waves are pulsating forces, not unlike those of the sea. 
They change shape and form, and their power ebbs and flows as they move 
through history. 
This may be the case with the new totalitarian wave which has 
flown out of China to the south. It may undergo profound changes as it 
moves outward. It may lose or gather momentum as it mixes with the 
political cross currents of southeast Asia. 
For the present, however, the unescapable fact is that totalitarianism 
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and not freedom has emerged triumphant from the murky waters of the war of the 
deltas . Its triumph has been confirmed by Geneva and the pattern for a further 
advance in the Far F.ast is set. 
Nor are the consequences of Geneva confined to Asia and the Pacific 
area. Europe , too, will feel the impact of thio conference. Until Geneva, 
there was a chance that the great peoples of Western Europe would continue 
to move their national heritages in the di r ection of a United Europe. 
Thanks lo the courage , and the wi~;dom of a sincere American and a 
great Sec r etary of State , Geor ge C . Ma1·shall, and thanks to the financial 
sacr ifices of the American people who bore the cost of the Marshall plan 
willingly and generously, Weste r n Europe had been able to lift itse!! out of 
the mire of a disastrous war . It had begun the long slow ascent towards unity. 
It was on the verge of reaching the most elusive goal o! all , the !ormation 
of a common Eur opean a r my. Had this goal bc~n achieved France and 
Germany woui.d have ceased to r evolve in age-old, separate and suici dal 
orbits . The intelligence , the skills , the strengths of these and other 
gr eat nationo of Europe would no l onger have been pitted against each 
other i n sensel ess destructive rivalry . They would have been united for 
mut:.1al benefit and fo r the benefit of the entire world. 
This was a d r eam worth having and it was shared by great and 
small alike in Europe and in America . It was the hope of a century and it 
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stood on the very edge of achievement in the proposed creation of the 
European Defense Community, the common European Army. But now the 
dream is ending; the hope is dimming, 
These results were not expected when the Secretary of State, at 
the Berlin Conference last February announced that this nation had been 
committed to the Geneva meeting. I s ay this without reflecting on the 
intentions or the capacities of the Decretary of State. The Secretary is 
an able and devoted public servant, Some have even waxed lyrical in 
their appreciation of his exceptional qualities. It has been said, for 
example, that it is "wonderful" to have at last " a Secretary of State who 
isn't taken in by the Communists, who stands up to them." 
I cannot hope to match such eloquence in the expression of my re-
gard for the Secretary. That he did stand up to the Communists, however, is 
beyond doubt, The Secretary refused to participate in the Geneva Conference 
unless Mr, Molotov agreed that the Conference would in no way 
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constitute American recognition of Communist China. lie refused quite 
correctly eve n to accept Mr. 1\:olotov•s word in this matter. He insistccl 
that Mr. Molotov sign a piece of paper making clear that the Geneva meeting 
would in no way constitute reco3nition of Communist China. Th~.; Secretary 
!ought Mr. Molotov day after day at Be1lin on this issue of the piece of paper. 
And finally, because he had refused to be taken in by the CommuniGts, because 
he had stood up to them , the Secretary triumphed. Mr. Molotov capitulated. 
And in a climax worthy of the best of our curre11t telcvi:;ion dramas, Mr. 
Molotov signed the piece of paper. 
The Secretary is to be commcnued for not b~inJ taken in by the 
Communists, for standing up to th<-m , for obtaining this piece of paper . 
We still have the piece of paper in our archives, I presume and 
meanwhile the Communists have obtained at Geneva all they set out to 
acquire at Berlin a few months ago. 
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The Secretary of State was hopeful of the possible results of 
Geneva when he returned from Berlin to prepare for the conference. 
"Berlin," the Secretary of State said on his return, "cleared the way 
for other things to happen. 11 
These were prophetic words. 
Berlin cleared the way fo1· Geneva and a failure of American 
policy. At Geneva, international communism obtained by diplomacy what 
it had failed up to then to obtain by threats, bluster, propaganda, intimi-
dation and aggression. 
It obtained international stature for the Chinese Communist regime. 
It obtained a firm and perhaps decisive foothold in southeast Asia. 
It obtained the undermining of the cooperation of the free nations in 
Europe and the West. These are the visible consequences of Geneva. Beyond 
them are others, still only dimly seen. The repercussions of the Geneva 
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Confe r ence will echo throughout the world, in events in Germany, Japan, 
France , North Africa and many other areas, in less-audible ways for 
years to come . 
Geneva was a mistake; and the result is a failure of American 
policy. It is a profoundly humiliating result. 
I do not call attention to the mistake without an appreciation 
o! the many difficulties which confronted the Secretary of State at 
Berlin and Geneva. He had to deal with reluctant allies and obstinate 
enemies. He had to stand in the forefront and seek to negotiate a 
settlement :or peace while other s in this Administration oeat the drums 
fo r war behind his back. 
The job of the Secr etar y of State is an extraordinarily difficult 
one at t.~is time. It is not made easier by those in high official 
positions who, by offering public statements at inappropriate moments , 
in effect tell him how to run it. Nor is the job made easier by those 
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who in contemplating his "wonderful 11 qualities . do so in a partisan framework 
which tends to encourage disunity on foreign policy at a time when the Secretary 
should have the widest possible support in Congress and the country. 
Geneva is even now fast receding into history. Before it disappears 
and becomes a mere name, it is essential that we grasp the full implications 
of this conference because it leaves behind, in dangerous disorder, the foreign 
policy of the United States. 
We cannot conceal this disturbing fact by a repetition of the cliches 
of past years. Even Yalta, which for so long has served as a substitute for 
facing living realities, cannot be stretched and pulled far enough out of the dim 
past to conceal the impact of Geneva. The attempt to do so, if I may para· 
phrase a lucid expression from the rich anthology o£ the distinguished and able 
majority leader, the attempt to do so is like "trying to cover an elephant with 
a donkey". 
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Even a visit from the Prime Minister of Britain and the 1ssuance 
of cordial joint statements cannot conceal the fact that the policy of the 
United Stat cs has been gravely damaged by Geneva, 
~ uch less can this fact be concealed by glib phrases. The 
dominoes are falling. The cork in the bottle has popped. The parlor-
game era off oreign policy is over. Either we face this reality or we risk 
the commission of other errors even graver than Geneva. 
All that has been done at Geneva cannot be undone. We are not, 
however, even at this late date, without resources. We can still have a 
foreign policy that will keep this nation Gafe and free and at peace. But 
we can have it only if we recognize the errors that have been made and 
act to correct them. 
We can do nothing or wor se than nothing if we cling to the illusion 
that television performances are a substitute for sound foreign policies; 
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that eleventh hour flights to foreign capitals are a substitute for carefully 
culti "at ed, carefully maintained ccoperation with friendly nations; that 
strong wo1·ds, even massive words, equate with a strong policy-- that they 
take the place of genuine strength and conviction. 
The Secretary of State used an eloquent phrase some time ago 
when he spoke of an "agonizing reappraisal. 11 Reappraisals of foreign policy 
should go on continuously. The world changes and policies must be adjusted 
to fit the changes. There can be only one fixed constellation in the foreign 
policy of the United States: the welfare of the nation under God; the preserva-
ti on of the f1·ee institutions which give us the promise of a meaningful 
life. 
Beneath this constellation, it is entirely proper and necessary 
that reappraisals of foreign policy should go on continuously. This is a 
function which normally pertains to the executive branch of the government. 
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If, however, the time has come for something extraordinary, for an 
"agonizing reappraisal" then the Senate of the United States should 
participate fully in it. We have a sworn constitutional duty to do so. 
Out of this body can come guides which may assist the President in 
extricating our policies from the bog of confusion in which they now 
flounder. 
This "agon~zing reappraisal" of policy seems already to have 
begun. In my opinion, it has begun on a note of irresponsible partisan-
ship. A few weeks ago, the Postmaster ~General of the United States, 
a member of the President's Cabinet, found time from his duties of de-
livering the mails to deliver some political remarks in Indiana on the 
subject of foreign policy. He began his reappraisal by going back a 
decade or more in search of the causes of the loss of Indochina. He 
discovered these causes, like long-lost letters, in such places ao Yalta, 
Teheran and Potsdam. 
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As I recall, there were res elutions introduced in Congress last 
year to repudiate the Yalta and other wartime a greements. The Administration, 
only condcmnat ion of the violations; 
however, has never sought repudiation/ nothing has ever come of these l'e:Jolu-
ti ons . Unless the Administration has changed its position, unless it now 
proposes to seek repudiation of these agreements, I cannot see any value in 
beginning a reappraisal with them. If we are to have a meaningful! review 
of the situation in which we now find ourselves it can hardly start in the remote 
past. Much 1 es s can it begin with place-names like Yalta, Teheran and 
Potsdam, pulled out of a mail-bag. 
A few days ago, in a different vein, in a responsible vein, the 
able majority leader raised the question of seating Communist China in the 
United Nations. He made clear his opposition to any such attempt with all 
the vehemence and eloquence of which b~ is capable. I have the highest 
regard for the sincerity and the consistency of the distinguished majority 
leader and I can appreciate his sentiments in this matter. 
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But with all due respect to the distinguished majority leader, 
I do not believe that a reappraisal of policy ought to begin with an 
event that has not happened. The President has not indicated, so far as 
I am aware, that he is about to change the policy pursued by the previous 
administration, the policy of opposing the seating of Communist China in 
the United Nations. That policy has kept the Peking government of Communist 
China from gaining a seat in the United Nations. 
Does the President plan to change this policy? Is the 
distinguished majority leader aw:l.re of such an intention? I! so, it 
would be most helpful if he would enlighten the Senate on this matter. 
It seems to me that this agonizing reappraisal, if it is to 
be useful to the nation, can only begin, not in the past, not in the 
future, but in the present. To be sure, it may lead us step by step 
to events in the past and it may point the way into the future. We 
live, however, not in the world of yeste:-day or the world of tomorrow, 
but in the world of today. If we wish to survive in that wol"ld, we 
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will do well to deal with its problems. In the reo.lm of foreign policy, this 
can only mean that the agonizing reappraisal should begin with the failux-e 
of policy on Indochina and its implications. 
We have got to find out what went wrong with this policy 
o1· its administration and determine the ways to prevent a repetition of 
the errors in the future. lf we fail to do so, if we lose ourselves in the 
past or the future, we shall go on collecting pieces of paper signed by the 
Communists while they continue to fatten their influence throughout the 
world. 
I should like to address myself first to the role of the Senate 
in the Indochinese situation. So far as I am aware, the Senate cooperated 
fully with the Administration from the very beginning of the gathering 
crisis. Not a single request in connection with Indochina was made by 
the Administration which was denied by this body or, for that matter, by 
the Congress. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 39, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 16 -
The Administration did make requests. It made repeated 
requests for military and econoMic assistance to Indochina. These 
were all honored by the Senate, perhaps more liberally and more promptly 
than they should have been. In 1953 alone, over a billion dollars 
in aid was provided fol' Indochina on the plea of the Administration 
that such assistance was in the vital inter ests of the United States . 
It is true that some members of the Senate differed on one 
point with the Administration. They would have preferred that the 
United ~tales av( id participation in the Geneva proceedings and said so 
in debate . Those of us who took this position -- and there were 
a number of Senatot·s on both sides of the a i s l e -- were no t necessarily 
opposed to negotiations as such. Some of us were aware , however, that 
the free nations were divided and confused on the issue of Indochina. 
Before the United States participated in <l conference with the cohesive 
forces of communism, we wanted the division and the confusion eliminated 
on our side . 
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In the light of what has happened was this preference unfounded? 
Is it not true that in the end the Administration was forced to accept the 
validity of this position? Did we not, for all practical purposes, abandon 
the Conference long ago? Could the terms of the settlement which is about 
to be achieved have been any less favorable if we had not become involved 
in the first place? On the contrary, there is reason to believe that the terms 
are likely to be more unfavorable than they would otherwise have been, had 
this country steered clear of the entir.e business . 
The Senate, however, was not consulted on the decision to 
participate in the Conference. We were not, again to borrow a lucid expres-
sion from the distinguished majority leader, "in on the take-off" even though 
all of us and the entire nation are inevitably "in on the crash landing. 11 Had 
this body been properly consulted from the outset and not simply at the last 
moment, it is possible that the error of participation might never have 
occurred. 
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As it was , the d e bate in the Senate which preceded the Geneva Con-
!erence may have helped to prevent a compo unding of the error. It may hnve 
helped to prevent what, in my opinion, would have been a far more serious 
• 
mistake -- armed involvement of the United States in Indochina. 
Just prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, it became 
apparent that persons close to the Administration had !orzotten what the 
President had said on February lOth. On that date, he had told a conference of 
newsmen that : 
no o .1e could be more bitterly op}'OSed to ever gett:ng the 
Uni t~tl States involved in. a hot war in that region (meaning 
Indochina) than I am . 
But a short time after, some of the leading figures in the Adminis-
tration began to act as though they had not heard the P1·esident. It fell to members 
of the Senate lo inform them of what he had s aid. As I recall, there were 
many cross-currents of opinion in the debate that took place in the Senate prior 
to the opening of the Gene'va Conference. Almost all opinions, however, con -
verged on one point: The United States should no t become involved alone in a 
shooting war in Indochina. 
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Was this an errc neous position to take? Who would quarrel 
with it now? Should the rncrnbers of the Senate have urged the Administra-
tion, instead, to add to the unsettled conflict in Korea still another in 
Southeast Asia? Should the Senate have sat in silence while the Adminis-
tration stumbled into the war in Indochina? Into a war without p r eparation, 
without popular support, without any concept of where it would take us o r where 
it would end? 
What would this nation have used to carry an involvement in 
Indochina to a decisive conclusion, even assuming that it did not lead 
to the atomi c holocaust of World War III? I have seen one estimate 
which was published in U.S. News and World Report some weeks ago. It 
should be a reliable estimate since it is attributed to the Chief of staff of 
the Army, General Matthew B . Ridgway. 
In this estimate, it is calculated that to have won the war in 
Indochina would have required 5 to 10 American combat divisions at the 
outset. More divisions had the F r ench reduced thei r forces o r had the 
• 
Chinese Communists entered the conflict in force. 
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Where would the se divisions have come from? They were not avai 1-
able then nor are they a·.'ailable now. VIe have a "new look" in the a::.-med forces 
but we do not have new divisions. \\"e do not e ·.rcn have some of the old ones. 
To have obtai ned the necessary manpower for use in Indochina would have m-
volvcd, according to the estimate I have just summarized, an increase in draft 
calls from 25, 000 to 100,000 men per month. And these men would have been 
sent into a con!l ict for which even the French were not drafting men. 
I do not know whether t 11e President himself ever seriously con-
si dered committing this nation to an armed involvement in Indochina. Neverthe-
l ess, the air around him was full of military sound and fury just prior to Geneva. 
There was much talk of involvement, even though Indochina would 
have been in every sense "a nibbling war". 
The terra.in of the Indochinese conflict--the flooded deltas , the 
thousands of scattered vi llc:.tieS , the jungles - - is made to order for the "nibbling" 
of mechanized forces. The French have been nibbled and chewed for eight years. 
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.. Nibbli:1g ware, 11 however, w-e have been told are worse than atomic 
wars. Yet those who have laid down this principle carried this country to the 
brink of engagement in the "nibbling war" in Indochina. 
It may be that those who were seriously considering this course and 
publicly hinting at its adoption, had not seen the terrain in Indochina. Perhaps 
they believed that the United States could have easily obtained a victory in 
Indochina. Perhaps they felt that Indochina was a bargain-rate war , that the 
cost could be calculated, not in men's lives but in painless - sounding abstractions 
like naval power and air power. 
But surely they must remember what happened in ~<orea. In Korea we 
were able to bring to bear the massive retaliation of naval and air power in cir-
cumstances far more favorable than those that exist in Indochina. Four years 
after we have no victory in Korea . We have a tenuous temporary truce . 
Even this truce was not achieveJ with the painless-sounding 
abstt·actions of naval and air power alone . These played thei::.- part. but: the AnPm> 
was convinceo of the (uti'..ity of bis aggression only after hundre ds of 
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thousands of A•nc r ic:\nR and othars had struggled back and forth in the mud, the 
snow and the blood of a W<lr -battered land. 
The truce ,llid not come until after a grueling bitter conflict. It did 
not come unti 1 thousands, in the air and on the sea as well as on the land, had 
given their lives . 
I do not say that the Administration should refrain from considering 
the military aspects of any international crisis \'l'ith which we are confronted. 
Such considerations are ab&olutely es scntial in a world from which war, un-
fortunately , has "lOt been banished. The Administration, however , ought not 
to pursue these considerations in public. We ought to be spared the ludicrous 
spectacle of this g r eat nation being led to the brink of war in public statements 
and actions on one day and backed away from it the next. If this diplomacy of 
bluster and retreat is designed to confuse the enemy, it succeeds only in con -
fusing the American people. This country has not achieved greatness under the 
guidance of b l uffers , blusters, and buffoons. We can 1 os e it if we cease to 
say what we mean and mean what we say in foreign policy. 
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The Ser.ate, in debate on Indochina thought through soberly and fully 
the implications of involvement in Indochina. I£ the debate helped to turn the Ad-
ministration from the ""urse of involvement which at least at one time in the 
crisis, it appeared bent upon, then the de!:>ate, in my opinion, was a useful one. 
Had the Administration undertaken adequate, proper and timely 
consultation with the Senate in this matter, it is entirely possible that a 
consistent American policy could have been obtained before the Indochinese 
situation reached the stage of crisis. In my remarks of April 14th, however, 
a few days before the opening of the Geneva Conference, I found it necessary 
to call attention to the !act that 
the administration has not yet seen fit to include the chair-
man and the ranking minority members of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in its trust (on Indochina policy). 
Other members of Congress wert: consulted shortly before that time, 
but for some unexplained reascn these distineuished members were overlooked. 
Several days later the error was rectified and subsequently consultation improved 
markedly. But by then, the damage had been done. 
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The Administration and presumably those who spoke !or it had already 
scattered to tne four winds such diplomatic resources which we poeoeased to 
deal with the situation. They had spoken bold but futile words. The administra-
ti on had already staked our diplomacy on the hasty creation of an ill-conceived 
alliance for sout beast Asia which refused to be born, The nation, in short, had 
already been gambled into an untenable position on Indochina. 'Nhen the \\'i th-
drawal hom this position came, it lert the VietNamese and French rcsi stance in 
Indochina expooed and undercut and ready for the collapse. 
The consequences were inevitable. A French government which had 
staked its life on military aid from this country to rescue Dien Bien Phu was 
forced to resign. The French began to draw in their forces in the northern delta. 
Viet Namese nationalist troops supplied with weapons and equipment paid for by 
the American people began to go over to the enemy in increasing numbers, 
taking their equipment with them. The truce which is n.ow being negotiated is 
only the last act in this tragic drama. 
How did this sequence of events develop? Why were the policies of 
this nat ion gambled into virtual bankruptcy in Indochina? There is a 
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background to this tragedy and it began about a year ago in Indochina. 
A year ago, the French devised a plan for a solution to the stalemated 
war of the deltas. This was the Navarre Plan. It was designed to eliminate the 
comn'lUnist threat i n Indochina and to insure the independence of the three 
Indochinese states of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. 
The Navarre Plan involved certain changes in military strategy to 
make possible offensive rather than defensive action against the communist-led 
forces of the Viet Minh under Ho Chi-Minh. It involved a massive training and 
equipment program for the local nationalist armed forces, notably those of Viet 
Nam. It involved a continued French military effort in Indochina until such time 
as the local nationalists could themselves carry the burden of the conflict. It 
involved vastly expanded military and other aid for Indochina from this country. 
Beyond these essential elements, the key to the plan lay in the 
political realm. The key, upon which success or failure turned, was the 
finalizing of the grant of independence from F rance to the three Indochinese 
states. 
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For years, the Frcr.ch who had gone a long way in granting 
independence , hesitated to turn this key . Last summer in conjunction 
with the request fo r additional aid for Indochina, we were assured that th~ 
n•o 1ent of full independence was at hand, If that had been the case, then the 
Nava:cre plan offered p r ospects fo r a successful solution to the Indochinese 
situation. As I pointed out in a r epor t to the For eign Relations Committee 
on my return from Indochina last fall , however , the plan could not succeed 
unless all par ts were effectivel y carried out and , further, that lasting 
success depended on sti ll anothe r facto r which had not at that time been 
noted in offici a l statements . It seemed to me that the nationalio t 
governments of the thr ee Indochinese states and especially that of Viet 
Nam had to put down firm roots in their own peoples , Only by so doing 
could they expect to win away the acti ve support o r at least the benevolent 
o r fea r ful neutr ality which at that time was held by the Communists 
masquerading as nationalists . 
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The Navarre Plan failed. It failed, not because the change in 
military strategy which it involved was necessarily ill-conceived. Not 
be~ause the French shirked their military responsibilities. Not because 
American aid was inadequate. 
The Plan failed because the principal nationalist leadera of 
Viet Nam were unable or unwilling to make the effort necessary to rally the 
peoples of Indochina against the Communists. 
It failed because the French were unable or unwilling to take 
the decisive political steps which would have made the independence of 
Viet Nam clear~ cut and unequivocal. !nstead1 negotiations for this lJI!rpose 
dragg~c! on interminably and the precious hours which were neeC.ed to gal -
vanize the struggle for independence slipped away. These negotiations 
began last year and by the time the Geneva Conference began, they were 
still going on inconclusively. 
I think it is of the greatest significance that in the truce which is now 
their 
being arranged Laos and Cambodia will probab!y manage to retain/independence 
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o von H·.oush thoy ?o•••••od. ro l~~ivoly speaking, the smallest military 
establishments in the area . Viet Nam , whose defense forces numbered 
sever al hundred thousands and included skilled t r oops of the French Union 
has passed partially into Communist control. The answer to this apparent 
paradox may be found in part per haps , in the fact that the finalizing of the 
independence of Laos and Cambodia was no t delayed as in the ca::;e of Viet 
Nam . It may a l so be found, pe::.·lnps, in the fact that the r ulers of these two 
count ries stayed i n thei r ho~nelands and l ed thei r people. 
Certainly, eviuence that the nationalist l eaders in Viet Nam wer e 
no t devel oping r oots i n the popul ace mus t have been vi sible months ago . 
Certainly the failur e o f the F r ench to move decisively •o grant indnp.,.ndAro,p 
to this state was evi dent months ago . What action did the administration 
take to counter these failur es? Did officials in the Administr:::~.tion 
r eceive accurate r eports on developmcl'ts in the field? Did they know 
what was happening? If they did know , why was the r e no r eport to the 
Sena te and the A:nerical' people on the t r ue situation? If they knew, 
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how is it possible to account for the optimism that seemed to prevail 
almo st until the las t hour be fore the crisis? If they knew, how could the 
Secretary of Defense be quo te d as late as February 9~h a J s uy:.a g 11 ~ 
wo uld think that a milit<.:t<y ,.~.r:tory would be perhaps both possible and 
probable. 11 
If they knew that a failure was i m pending, as they sho uld have 
known, why did responsible officials go on piling up m:.lita::y supplies and 
equipm ent in the warehouses of Indochina? Part of these supplies are now 
going to the Communists by defection of troops or abandonment, and may 
very well be turned against American forces at some time in the future. 
The Navarre Plan , if I m ay reiterate, died not from military weak-
nes s but fro m political causes. At no tim e until the battle of Dien Bien Phu 
did the French or the Viet Na m ese indicate in any way that the military 
aid being supplied by this co t:ntry was inadequate . They were opposed, 
I believe, even to the sending of a training mis s~ on fro m this country. 
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At all times, at least until Dien Bien Phu, the France- Viet Nnmcse 
forces far outnumbered the Viet Minh divisions. The non-Communis ts had 
absolute control of the air and, by far, a superiority in naval craft and hca,•y 
equipment. In these circumstances how can the failure of the Navarre Plan be 
attributed to anything other than political causes? 
But in what fashion did the Aclministrati on react when it finally 
realized that the Navarre Plan was failing? It reacted as though the causes 
of the failure were rni litary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
Armed Forces on March 22d still insisted, in his words: "The French are going 
to win. It ia a fight that is going to be finished with our help." This was a 
military answer to a political problem. 
At the same time, the Sect·etary of State set out to seek united action 
in the form of the ill-dated Southeast Asia alliance. This, too, hacl he been sue-
cessful, would have been a military answer to a political problem. 
The nations which the Secretary tried to bring into the alliance were 
the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, France, New Zealand, the t!nitecl I<'ingdom 
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and the Indo-chinese states. Had the alliance been established, its power 
would have rested largely on non-Asian states. It was an ill-conceived 
alliance. It was based on the premise that the defense of A sian nations against 
comlnunist tyranny rests in the first instance on the West. That, in my 
opinion, is a false premise. Asian freedom must be defended primarily by 
Asians. 
A people, whether in Asia or in the Americas, can preserve their 
independence only it they have it in the first place and if they are willing to fight 
to keep it. Bey0nd this initial responsibility which ever y nation must accept, 
nations can comhine among themselves for a joint defense of freedom . If they 
are threatened by aggression, singul arly or jointly, they can seek recourse 
through the United Nations. But from the beginning to the end of this process of 
defense, the key factor is the determination of the peopl e of each nation to defend 
their freedom. This factor was l acking in the Secretary of State's eleventh hour 
attempt to set up an alliance to save Indochina. 
His attempt failed and the wreckage of American policy in Southeast 
Asia now lies among the ruins of the war of the deltas. We are confronted with 
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the urgent necessity of raising up a new, a sounder, and more durable policy for 
that area. 
Southeast Asia today is no less important to the security and welfare 
of free nations than it was a few month9 ago when the Secretary of State said : 
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on 
Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist 
Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever 
means would be a grave threat to the whole free community. 
As long as the threat of totalit<::.rian ac;gression remains in southeast 
Ania, the danger to the United States and other free nations will also remain. 
The lo:; s of part of Indochina does not diminish this danger; it increases it. 
But in remaining alert to the danger in Southeast Asia we cannot 
ignore other areas of great importance to our security. Southeast Asia is only 
one front in the many-fronted struggle between freedom and tyranny. All of them 
have a bearing on the security of the United States. \ · c can use our strength 
effectively in this many-sided conflict, only if we deploy it within this broad con-
text. In determining policies for southeas t Asia, its relative significance must 
be weighed against that of other fronts . 
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The prin.ary dccisio.1s in such n1atters rest with the President. 
It is his responsibility to reconstruct policies in Southeast Asia within 
the world- wide framework, which will serve to safeguard the nation. 
It seems to me , however , that if such policies are to prove more durable 
than tho:>e which haYe l:ee.1 pursued in the past , they need to be constructed 
on certain principles. These are principles which can be found in the 
ft4ndamental values of our own society as well as in the values of an 
awakened Asia. 
I a11 led to make certain suggestions along these lines . I cl a i m 
no originality in these suggestions . I am stating them only because I 
believe there is a need to consider a cl ear - cut course of action to end 
the weak, aimless drift and the futile expediency into which our foreign 
policy for Southeast Asia appears to have slipped. If we are to avoi d 
precipitate action o r a blind retr eat in Asia, ei ther of which might be 
disastrous, we must somehow re - establish guideposts to action i n that 
area. 
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I make the following suggestions without in any eense regarding them 
as immutable. I make them with a full awareness of their imperfections and 
their inadequacies . I hope they will be challenged, debated, diocusacd and im-
proved, but I m~ko them now in the hope that they may help to put up the guide-
po:>ts that are eo urgently needed. 
1. Colonialism- - Chinese Commuaist or any other- -has 
no place in Asia and the policies of the Uuitcd States 
should in no way act to perpetuate it. 
2 . The United States should look with favor on govern-
ments in Asia which are representati vc of their 
people and responsive to their ncedll; but this 
nation should not intervene in the internal affairs of 
any peaceful country. 
3, The defense of freedom in .Asia must rest in the 
first instance on the will and determination of the 
free peoples of that region. 
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4. Systems of alliances for the defense of free nations 
in Asia against aggression must draw their primary 
and preponderant strength from the Asian countries; 
the a ssociation of the United States, if at all, with 
such alliances should be indirect, through the machinery 
of Anzus or similar combinations of non-Asian countries. 
5. The United Nations should serve as the only world-wide 
marshalling center for resistance, in the event of 
aggression or threat of aggression in Asia. 
6. The economic development of the nations of Asia is 
preponderantly the responsibility of the peoples of 
that region, to be pursued in accord with their individual 
national genius and objectives; any assistance rendered by 
this country, whether directly or through the United Nations 
or other agencies, should be peripheral in scope and should 
be rendered only when genuinely desired. 
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The erection of cuidepo::.ts auch as these is only one requirement for 
a policy that can succeed in Asia. Tl is step will be futile unless the conduct 
of our f<Jreign policy is restored to the dignity and orderliness which the people 
of this country have a right to expect. 
V!hat transpired in the weel·s of the gathering crisis before and during 
the Geneva crisis came close to being a shameful spectacle. The conduct of 
policy in that period spread fear and uncertainty throughout this country and 
seriously damaged the prestige of the United States abroad. 
The time has come to put a stop to the multipl e voices which 
apparently speak for the Administration on foreign policy. One part of the 
Administration cannot indicate publicly that we are about to intervene in a war 
and then another part suggest the opposite course on the following day. 
The people of this country elected a President to conduct th..!ir foreign 
policy, with the advice anu consent of the Senate. The President can delegate his 
authority if he so chooses. But for the sake of the or1lcrly processes of govern-
ment, it ought to be clc:lr t"'' whom he has delegated it when he does so . 
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Presumably the President has a Secretary of State to assist him in 
matters of foreign policy. If that is the case, then the only official voices we 
should hear in these matters ought to be the voice of the President and the voice 
of the Secretary of State. If that is not the case, then it would be most helpful if 
the President would enlighten the nation as to whom and at what particular moment 
others are speaking in the name of this country on foreign policy. 
Before concluding my remarks today, I want to say only one thing 
more. The Geneva Conference, I believe may mark a major turning point in the 
tide of world affairs. We may well be entering a period of great change and flux. 
The change is already suggested by the "agonizing reappraisal" which has begun 
and which, before it is over may lead to agonizing readjustments. In these cir-
cumstances, it seems to me that the temptation to assume an "all or nothing" 
posture with respect to foreign policy is ever-present. The tendency will be to 
blame friendly nations for all that has gone wrong. We will be tempted to insist 
that they play the game our way or we will pick up o~r marbles and go home. 
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I! this attitude prevails , i! it is the dcci sivc one, I believe we 
will end up, not with "all" but with "nothing" . The tremendous economic 
sacrifices which the peot l e of this nation have made in the lavt decade will 
have been made in vain. The lives that were given in World War II and in 
l<orca to construct a n1ore orderl y and decent world wi 11 have been given in Y~B in. 
If we choose the course of all or nothing, we may perhap s secure a 
few years respite from the international r esponsibil ities which we have been 
carrying . Then, the world will once again close in on us . We will end up with 
nothing, nothing but our own bitterness . It has happened before. 
We need not choose this course. There is another open to us . If 
the present reappraisa l is conducted with r ecognition not only of immediate in-
tcrests, immediate passions , but also with a sense of responsibility to the genera· 
ti ons of Americans that will come after us,. then I believe w.;:. s!1all take this other 
course . I believe we shall find much wort!l preserving in what has been done in 
the last decade, much that can be built. upon. We will not obtain "all" but neither 
will we settle for "not!1ing". 
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The choice is ours to make. Ultimately, it is a choice between 
shouldering day-4n and day-out a part of the responsibility -- however, burden-
some and irritating -- of maintaining freedom in a world from which tyranny 
has not yet been banished; or of abandoning this responsibility today only to have 
to pick up tomorrow the crushing burden of a third world war. 
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